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98 N.C. L. REV. 389 (2020)

THE NEXT STEP: BUILDING, FUNDING, AND
MEASURING PRETRIAL SERVICES
(POST-BAIL REFORMS)*
GLORIA GONG **
Bail reform offers a tantalizing promise: individuals who cannot afford bail
but who will show up for court and pose no public safety risk will be able to
return to their homes, families, and jobs instead of awaiting trial in jail. Bail
reform may reduce the concentrated costs the criminal justice system imposes
on poor people and communities, avoid unnecessary imprisonment and its
attendant harms, and allow local governments to redirect scarce funds away
from the machinery of incarceration toward prevention and reinvestment.
But to realize that promise, jurisdictions implementing bail reforms must
navigate three implementation challenges that, unaddressed, threaten to
undermine the reforms’ success:
1) What system will local governments put in place in lieu of pretrial
incarceration?
2) How will they pay for it?
3) How will they demonstrate to their stakeholders that the new
alternative to pretrial incarceration is working?
Courts and governments considering transforming their pretrial practices
have access to a wealth of national expertise and resources directed at catalyzing
reform. They have many fewer resources, however, aimed at supporting them
through the administrative hurdles of setting up a new system to replace the
one that has been jettisoned after reforms are adopted. Yet getting
implementation right is crucial to realizing the promise of criminal justice
reforms, and poor implementation risks unintentionally reproducing harms or
triggering backlash.
Over the past eighteen months, the Harvard Kennedy School
Government Performance Lab (“GPL”) has begun receiving requests from state
and local governments for support in implementing reforms to systems closely

* © 2020 Gloria Gong.
** Director of Research and Innovation, Harvard Kennedy School Government Performance
Lab. Thanks to Judith Resnik, Anna VanCleave, Abbye Atkinson, Brandon Buskey, Beth Colgan,
Pamela Foohey, Lisa Foster, Paul Heaton, Alec Karakatsanis, Cortney Lollar, David Marcus, Maureen
O’Connor, Jeffrey Selbin, Joanna Weiss, and other participants in the Yale Law School 2018 Liman
Colloquium Who Pays? Fines, Fees, Bail, and the Cost of Courts and the Association of American Law
Schools’ 2019 symposium on court debt and remedies.
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intertwined with court debt—namely, bail and related pretrial practices and
community supervision. Based on the GPL’s work, this Essay briefly outlines
the key challenges most often overlooked by governments considering pretrial
reforms: designing and implementing pretrial programs that avoid replicating
the harms of traditional community supervision, identifying and realizing
anticipated cost savings, and evaluating the success of pretrial reforms. Each
section notes an initial set of approaches that may be useful to consider as well
as areas for additional exploration.
I. GROWING CONSENSUS THAT CURRENT PRETRIAL PRACTICES ARE
HARMFUL AND COSTLY
The cost of money bail to individuals and communities is high. Whether
individuals post bail directly or purchase commercial bail bonds and pay
interest, individuals, their families, and their communities bear the financial
burden. 1 Those who cannot pay remain detained until trial and pay a different
set of economic costs, including job loss and reduced earnings. 2 And those who
cannot pay remain detained until trial. Recent research has demonstrated that
pretrial detention leads incarcerated individuals to plead guilty at a higher rate,
increases both the likelihood and the length of incarceration, and is possibly
criminogenic. 3 Even short periods of incarceration can have harmful
downstream effects, reducing labor force participation and decreasing receipt of
benefits. 4 The combination of effective advocacy, targeted litigation, and
mounting evidence around the harms caused by the use of money bail is
galvanizing jurisdictions across the country to consider sweeping reforms. 5
Results from some cash bail systems reforms have been very promising.
New Jersey’s statewide shift toward use of risk evaluation and widespread
elimination of cash bail resulted in a thirty-five percent reduction of the pretrial

1. See MATHILDE LAISNE, JON WOOL & CHRISTIAN HENRICHSON, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE,
PAST DUE: EXAMINING THE COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF CHARGING FOR JUSTICE IN NEW
ORLEANS 7 (2017), https://storage.googleapis.com/vera-web-assets/downloads/Publications/past-duecosts-consequences-charging-for-justice-new-orleans/legacy_downloads/past-due-costs-consequencescharging-for-justice-new-orleans.pdf. [https://perma.cc/XC3Z-FM9Q] (showing that, in the cases
studied, defendants paid $6.4 million in nonrefundable bail costs).
2. See, e.g., Bruce Western, The Impact of Incarceration on Wage Mobility and Inequality, 67 AM.
SOC. REV. 526, 528 (2002).
3. Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson & Megan Stevenson, The Downstream Consequences of
Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 715, 718 (2017).
4. Will Dobbie, Jacob Goldin & Crystal S. Yang, The Effects of Pretrial Detention on Conviction,
Future Crime, and Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges, 108 AM. ECON. REV. 201, 201
(2018).
5. E.g., Sandra G. Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, 127 YALE L.J. 490, 492 (2018).
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jail population. 6 Evaluations in some jurisdictions that have begun to
experiment with reducing or eliminating the use of cash bail have shown that
an increase in individuals released on personal recognizance has not led to an
increase in failures to appear or recidivism. 7
Launching bail reform requires government leaders to navigate several
considerations, including shifting to a risk-based system, using risk-assessment
tools, establishing ability-to-pay determinations, overhauling bail schedules,
and responding to the use of commercial bail bonds in the existing system. Add
to those considerations the resources required to push through the state
constitutional amendments that have been necessary in some jurisdictions, new
legislation, and shifts in judicial practice, it’s no surprise that the question of
how to implement pretrial supports and services after reforms have been
adopted is often overlooked. For bail reform to be successful, though,
governments must not only do the hard work of decarcerating thousands of
individuals, but they must also set up pretrial systems that do not replicate the
harms of the cash bail system they are replacing. To support long-term reform,
these pretrial systems must be not only operationally effective but also fiscally
and politically sustainable.
II. PRETRIAL REFORM: IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES AND
OPPORTUNITIES
Governments requesting pretrial implementation technical assistance
from the GPL face three primary challenges: (1) designing effective pretrial
supports and services, (2) identifying and capturing cost savings, and (3)
evaluating and demonstrating impact. Below are key considerations for each of
these areas, including a discussion of relevant tools that may present useful
opportunities for governments to explore.
A.

Designing and Implementing Pretrial Programs That Avoid Harms of
Traditional Approaches, Preserve Public Safety, and Maximize Freedom

Reducing the use of cash bail may result in sharp increases in the number
of individuals released from incarceration prior to trial. Jurisdictions may
assume that the easiest response to individuals on pretrial release is to replicate
community supervision (probation and parole) in pretrial services or even to
directly expand community supervision agencies to house pretrial services.
6. GLENN A. GRANT, N.J. JUDICIARY, 2017 REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE
LEGISLATURE
4
(2017),
https://www.njcourts.gov/courts/assets/criminal/2017cjrannual.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U9Q9-8CGB].
7. CLAIRE M. B. BROOKER, PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., YAKIMA COUNTY, WASHINGTON
PRETRIAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IMPROVEMENTS: PRE- AND POST-IMPLEMENTATION ANALYSIS 2
(2017); Aurelie Ouss & Megan Stevenson, Evaluating the Impacts of Eliminating Prosecutorial Requests for
Cash Bail 1 (George Mason Legal Studies Research, Paper No. LS 19-08, 2019).
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However, community supervision in its current configuration is often
sprawling and costly and can create a slippery slope into continued criminal
justice system involvement. In 2016, only fifty-seven percent of individuals
exiting parole did so successfully; twenty-seven percent were incarcerated, and
another three percent absconded or had an outstanding warrant. 8 Chronically
underfunded, community supervision agencies often rely on burdensome user
fines and fees, which in some cases may interact with a “retained revenue”
system that generates incentives for perpetuating fines and fees. 9 Simply
replicating probation and parole in the pretrial arena threatens to reproduce the
shortcomings of community supervision systems and undermine the purpose of
bail reform (to say nothing of bypassing important questions about whether
supervision determinations prior to conviction can be treated similarly to those
post-conviction). Rather than blindly replicating deeply flawed community
supervision structures pretrial, jurisdictions building out pretrial services as part
of bail reform should test new and innovative approaches that avoid the known
flaws of traditional probation and parole.
For example, governments working to replace these traditional approaches
are implementing lighter-touch, resource-targeted strategies focused on
preparing recently released individuals for successful reentry and reducing their
chance of revocation. 10 Innovations in the community supervision and pretrial
space include replacing traditional systems of mass supervision with focused
supervision that substantially reduces supervision intensity on low-risk
offenders, which can mitigate deeper entanglement with the criminal justice
system for these individuals. 11
In addition to reducing the harms of over-supervision, pretrial service
agencies can actively experiment with supports designed to improve the success
of released individuals. These might take the form of practices that reduce
8. THE PEW CHARITABLE TRS., PROBATION AND PAROLE SYSTEMS MARKED BY HIGH
STAKES, MISSED OPPORTUNITIES 9 (2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/research-and-analysis/issuebriefs/2018/09/probation-and-parole-systems-marked-by-high-stakes-missed-opportunities
[https://perma.cc/G6N8-BATN].
9. COLUMBIA UNIV. JUSTICE LAB, TOO BIG TO SUCCEED: THE IMPACT OF THE GROWTH
OF COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT 4 (2018) [hereinafter
TOO BIG TO SUCCEED], https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D8709HV1/download
[https://perma.cc/FF9F-TVUT (staff uploaded archive)]; COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, EXEC.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FINES, FEES, AND BAIL: PAYMENTS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM
THAT
DISPROPORTIONATELY
IMPACT
THE
POOR
2
(2015),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/1215_cea_fine_fee_bail_issue_brie
f.pdf [https://perma.cc/DNK6-S4JC].
10. See TOO BIG TO SUCCEED, supra note 9, at 7–8.
11. EXEC. SESSION ON CMTY. CORRECTIONS, HARVARD KENNEDY SCH., TOWARDS AN
APPROACH TO COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: CONSENSUS DOCUMENT OF
THE
EXECUTIVE
SESSION
ON
COMMUNITY
CORRECTIONS
3–4
(2017),
https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/wiener/programs/pcj/files/Consensus_Final2.
pdf [https://perma.cc/YRJ3-WZTU].
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barriers to appearing in court—for example, text reminders of appearance
location and time, transportation, and child care assistance. It could also involve
innovative approaches to supervision that rely on contracting with local,
community-based nonprofits rather than expanding existing community
supervision programs. And finally, pretrial services agencies could explore ways
to offer voluntary referrals to preventative services that might address
underlying conditions, such as housing navigation, permanent supportive
housing, and mental and behavioral health treatment.
In Denver, for example, the GPL helped the city identify the costliest
chronically homeless individuals who were also involved with the criminal
justice system and provide them with safe, secure, long-term supportive
housing. 12 The program used innovative data tools to provide permanent
supportive housing services—including subsidized housing, behavioral health
services, and an Assertive Community Treatment Team—to individuals
experiencing homelessness and frequent interaction with the criminal justice
system. 13 The program targeted individuals with eight or more arrests in three
consecutive years, with three arrests marked as “transient,” meaning the
individual arrested was likely experiencing homelessness at the time of arrest. 14
Interim project results have shown that the program has increased housing
stability among participants. 15 Although participation in similar services should
not be linked with pretrial release conditions or detention determinations,
intentional linkages and warm handoffs to preventative services may have the
potential to interrupt cycles of involvement with the criminal justice system
that are driven by underlying challenges such as housing instability or mental
and behavioral health issues. 16 The availability of high-quality voluntary
12. GOV’T PERFORMANCE LAB, HARVARD KENNEDY SCH., DENVER PERMANENT
SUPPORTIVE HOUSING PAY FOR SUCCESS PROJECT 1–2 (2017) [hereinafter DENVER PERMANENT
SUPPORTIVE HOUSING], https://govlab.hks.harvard.edu/files/govlabs/files/denver_psh_pfs_project_
feature.pdf [https://perma.cc/NT5A-R9TD].
13. Id.
14. MARY CUNNINGHAM ET AL., URBAN INST., FROM HOMELESS TO HOUSED: INTERIM
LESSONS FROM THE DENVER SUPPORTIVE HOUSING SOCIAL IMPACT BOND INITIATIVE 5 (2018)
[hereinafter HOMELESS TO HOUSED], https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/99181/
from_homeless_to_housed_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/5FRR-M98T].
15. Id. at 36 (reporting that eighty-five percent of the program participants retained housing
without exits).
16. DENVER PERMANENT SUPPORTIVE HOUSING, supra note 12, at 1–2. “Warm handoff” is a
term (and practice) borrowed from the healthcare field. See Christine A. Pace et al., Warm Handoffs
and Attendance at Initial Integrated Behavioral Health Appointments, 16 ANNALS FAM. MED. 346, 346
(2018) (behavioral healthcare); Warm Handoff: Intervention, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. &
QUALITY,
https://www.ahrq.gov/patient-safety/reports/engage/interventions/warmhandoff.html
[https://perma.cc/7KYT-AYPN] (primary healthcare). In the social services context, warm handoffs
refer to practices that connect clients to services in a more intentional way. Compared to referrals in
which clients are responsible for outreach and enrolling, warm handoffs typically involve some level of
contact from a social worker, case manager, or equivalent who helps the client contact the service
provider to initiate enrollment and may provide information about the client to the provider.
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preventative services might also encourage judges to shift away from costly and
ineffective conditions, such as drug testing.
B.

Funding and Cost Capture: Can Pretrial Systems Be Funded by Cost Savings
from Bail Reform? How Much Do Reforms Actually Save and Can Those
Savings Be Recovered?

One of the key questions facing governments seeking to implement
pretrial reforms is how the pretrial services replacing incarceration will be
funded. Pretrial reform advocates often raise cost savings as a supporting
rationale for undertaking bail reform or even as a potential mechanism for
broader community reinvestment. 17 However, reforms do not automatically
translate into savings. We see jurisdictions making two types of common errors
in anticipating reform-generated savings: conflating average and marginal costs
in a way that likely overestimates the magnitude of potential savings and failing
to determine whether project cost savings can actually be recouped.
1. How Much Do Reforms Actually Save?
Predictions of potential savings generated by pretrial reforms often
overestimate the value of savings. One of the most common mistakes is
conflating average and marginal cost. 18 Savings estimates may calculate savings
as a function of reduction in jail usage and the average cost of incarceration, but
this approach ignores that funding is often committed in ways that do not scale
down with marginal decreases in use. In fact, the average amount spent on
incarcerating an individual for a day is very different than the amount of money
saved if that individual is not incarcerated for one day. The costs of
17. PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., PRETRIAL JUSTICE: HOW MUCH DOES IT COST? 5 (2017),
https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey
=4c666992-0b1b-632a-13cb-b4ddc66fadcd&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/CMD7-34JB].
18. See, e.g., BUCKEYE INST., THE FACTS: A COST SAVINGS ANALYSIS OF BAIL REFORM 1–3
(2018),
https://www.buckeyeinstitute.org/library/docLib/2018-03-30-The-Facts-A-Cost-SavingsAnalysis-of-Bail-Reform.pdf [https://perma.cc/U9G2-Q6CZ]. The analysis calculates savings by
multiplying average incarceration costs by the projected number of released individuals. Id. at 1–2.
However, the average costs used are based on costs reported by the Department of Rehabilitation and
Correction and appear to include the full costs of expenditures on jails, which means that only a small
fraction of those costs would translate into savings as the jail population is reduced incrementally.
ROBERT MEEKER, OHIO LEGISLATIVE SERV. COMM’N, FISCAL NOTE & LOCAL IMPACT
STATEMENT 2–3 (2018), https://www.legislature.ohio.gov/download?key=9107&format=pdf
[https://perma.cc/JBK5-FWRD]. The Buckeye Institute’s analysis was prominently cited in the Ohio
State Supreme Court’s Bail Task Force’s recommendation to reform Ohio’s bail system. See OHIO
SUPREME COURT, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO TASK
FORCE TO EXAMINE THE OHIO BAIL SYSTEM 2 (2019), http://www.sc.ohio.gov/Publications/
bailSys/report.pdf [https://perma.cc/ETT3-RUNH]. My point is not that the task force’s
recommendations were not sound, but that reformers often rely on analyses that are likely overstating
the value of savings that will be generated by reforms—or, at the very least, will only come true should
reforms generate full decarceration.
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incarceration are likely locked into buildings, staff, and service contracts. In
other words, jails continue to function even when prison populations decline.
Reducing jail usage by pretrial detainees does not dent the fixed costs of running
a jail; depending on the jail, marginal savings may be primarily generated from
reductions in health care treatments, meals, laundry, or other services that are
paid for on a per-unit basis. To realize larger savings, reforms would need to
reduce jail populations by sufficient amounts to allow the fixed costs of physical
and systems infrastructure to be recouped—closure of buildings or wings,
reduction in staff, and renegotiation of service contracts at a lower amount. 19
Because of these “cliff points”—that is, the point at which the potential savings
increase sharply because of the ability to recoup previously fixed costs—
jurisdictions often do not stand to see significant savings until there are
substantial reductions in incarceration rates overall. However, practitioners and
decisionmakers who misunderstand this point may assume that any reductions
in incarceration will yield the “average” amount of savings, leading them to
either overestimate savings or underestimate the scale of decarceration
necessary to achieve the desired projected savings.
2. Can Cost Savings Actually Be Realized?
The second important question for jurisdictions to address is whether cost
savings, even if correct, can actually be recouped. Even if savings are real,
jurisdictions may need to create innovative approaches to realize savings across
siloed agencies and over time. Local analysis is needed to determine whether
budgets will in fact see savings; if jail budgets are largely tied up in
infrastructure and labor contracts, reductions in jail usage may not automatically
yield significant savings. Jurisdictions seeking to capture cost savings face the
“wrong pockets” problem, where the agency paying for the intervention is not
the one where the benefits accrue. 20 In the case of bail reform, jurisdictions will
have to figure out how to bridge the gap between pretrial services administered
by courts or pretrial services agencies and the jail or sheriffs’ budgets that realize
savings from reduced jail usage.
19. The financial model of the Pay for Success (“PFS”) contract used by the state of New York
in its criminal justice PFS project advised by the GPL gives an example of calculations of cost savings
that take into account the “cliff points” at which reductions in incarceration would allow greater savings
to be generated by allowing the state to unwind larger spending areas, such as maintaining prison wings
or whole prisons. See New York State Criminal Justice Re-Entry Services, GOV’T PERFORMANCE LAB,
HARV. KENNEDY SCH., https://govlab.hks.harvard.edu/new-york-state-criminal-justice-re-entryservices [https://perma.cc/9K87-QZDL]; PAY FOR SUCCESS INTERMEDIARY AGREEMENT (Oct. 1,
2013), https://govlab.hks.harvard.edu/files/govlabs/files/nys_ceo_pfs_contract.pdf [https://perma.cc/
H3KS-UWF2].
20. See JOHN K. ROMAN, URBAN INST., SOLVING THE WRONG POCKETS PROBLEM: HOW
PAY FOR SUCCESS PROMOTES INVESTMENT IN EVIDENCE-BASED BEST PRACTICES 2 (2015),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/71501/2000427-solving-the-wrong-pocketsproblem_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/39W2-ZMPK].
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The wrong-pockets problem stands as a potential barrier to capturing cost
savings effectively. When one agency underwrites the cost of an intervention,
and the intervention yields benefits in a different agency, separate budgets,
authority, and interests may prevent the savings from being captured by the
beneficiary agency. This is particularly an issue if the savings were intended to
offset the cost of the intervention. For example, if spending by a probation
agency reduced recidivism drastically, but the cost savings from reduced
incarceration all accrued to a separate department of corrections overseeing
prisons, it is not a given that the intervention—even though successful—will
have self-generated funding to continue unless the probation agency can find a
way to convince the corrections agency or a central decisionmaker to
redistribute the savings.
New Jersey’s bail reform efforts resulted in a near-complete elimination of
cash bail and a thirty-five percent reduction of the pretrial jail population. 21
However, program administrators identified lack of funding for the
administration of pretrial services in the first year as a serious threat to the
sustainability of the changes. 22 A report by the New Jersey Judiciary on the
initial outcomes of the program flagged a “substantial annual structural deficit”
as a major cause for concern and noted that unless corrected, pretrial services
expenses would outstrip revenues a little more than a year into the reform. 23
Another challenge is that benefits may accrue over time, but pretrial
services agencies will need upfront funding to pay for their services. For
example, reforms instituted today may create savings next year. Jurisdictions
wishing to pay for pretrial services from cost savings must find methods to
minimize the delay between the upfront spending required to set up the pretrial
services bail and other pretrial reforms and the future generated savings.
Finally, savings may accrue in ways that are not technically or politically
feasible to realize. For example, as jail populations decrease, jails may need
fewer staff. However, contracts, union stipulations, or political ramifications of
reducing staffing may bar jurisdictions from cutting staff in step with reduced
jail populations.
Some jurisdictions may experiment with ways to recoup fixed costs by
renting out jail beds to neighboring locales or to other agencies. These
approaches may allow additional recovery of costs that otherwise would have
been fixed. Yet, bed rentals function to recoup costs by continuing to incarcerate
individuals and may simply shift the site of the cost and jurisdiction for
incarceration.

21. See GRANT, supra note 6, at 4.
22. See id. at 25.
23. See id.
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In our experience with assisting state and local governments in calculating,
tracking, and realizing cost savings through Pay for Success (“PFS”)
contracting, 24 recovering savings generated by preventative interventions
requires some combination of the following conditions.
a.

Central Budget Authority

A central budget authority, such as a state budget agency, can resolve the
wrong-pockets challenge by allocating resources across the system. Although
individual agencies do not have incentives to create savings for other agencies,
budget offices are able to look across agencies to see how spending in one area
saves the state government money, even if savings accrue in a neighboring
agency or in the future. Central budget authorities, mainly legislatures, can
authorize or fund preventative spending that will generate savings that the
implementing agency could not capture alone.
b.

Ability To Calculate and Track Cost Savings

Calculating and tracking cost savings puts government innovators in a
position to be able to justify preventative interventions from a dollars-and-cents
perspective. In order to do so, agencies must build the data and analytic capacity
to calculate and track the value of savings generated.
c.

Ability To Count Social and Public Value Generated

Many interventions may prove more costly than the amount of savings
that governments are able to recoup. However, since most interventions have
policy rationales, agencies that develop the ability to reflect a realistic and
rigorously calculated public and social value of an intervention have an
additional tool to persuade central budget authorities to shift funding toward
preventative interventions or reform efforts.
d. Ability To Make Changes in Spending on Infrastructure, Personnel, and
Contracted Services
Agencies are unlikely to be able to capture significant cost savings by
reducing staffing, closing a wing of a jail, or shifting contracts because they lack
the authority to make such decisions. One underexplored area is whether jails
and other agencies that will see reduced utilization under pretrial reforms can
24. PFS contracting (or social impacts bonds) is a contracting model that allows governments to
shift toward performance-based contracts with social service providers. In traditional PFS contracts,
governments create a performance contract with a social service provider or an intermediary. Thirdparty investors loan funding to the project to cover the operating costs of delivering services. If the
service proves successful and delivers pre-agreed upon results, the government makes payments that
are used to repay the operating loan. If the services are not successful, the government does not pay
for the services and the investors lose their capital.
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innovate ways to shift internal budgets toward agency-funded preventative or
pretrial services. For example, a sheriff’s office experiencing sharp declines in
jail populations might not be able to reduce staffing due to staffing contract
structures but might be able to reallocate staff toward diversion, community
service navigation, or other pretrial-related services. These types of shifts may
prove to be more feasible than straight cost recapture and could allow
jurisdictions another path toward funding pretrial or criminal justice reform
interventions.
The GPL’s work in PFS contracts and in helping jurisdictions shift toward
preventative spending has sparked some creative approaches to contracting
structures, redeployment of resources, and community reinvestment. This is
one area in which we are particularly eager to create new solutions. 25
C.

Evaluating Programs and Demonstrating Success to Stakeholders

Finally, long-term success for bail reform will depend on elected officials,
judges, law enforcement, and constituents believing that the reforms have been
good for their communities. In addition to responding to misleading
information from entrenched interests 26 and effectively communicating the
stories of affected individuals and communities, jurisdictions should prioritize
the capacity to identify and demonstrate the impact of reforms on outcomes
such as cost savings and public safety. This allows actors with often misaligned
incentive structures to lend ongoing support. 27 Jurisdictions implementing bail
reform should institute two types of measurement—rigorous evaluations to

25. See generally GOV’T PERFORMANCE LAB, HARVARD KENNEDY SCH., SOCIAL IMPACT
BONDS
101
(2017),
https://govlab.hks.harvard.edu/files/govlabs/files/sibs_101_gpl_2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5YWP-3DG4] (discussing how governments across the country are testing the Pay
for Success approach).
26. Bail bond companies have been relentless in their efforts to stymie bail reform. See, e.g., John
Buntin, The Fight To Fix America’s Broken Bail System, GOVERNING (Oct. 2017),
https://www.governing.com/topics/public-justice-safety/gov-bail-reform-texas-new-jersey.html
[https://perma.cc/F2LT-CFA9]; Sheila Cohen, Bail Bond Industry Fights Back Against Moves To Limit
or End Cash Bail, WIS. PUB. RADIO (Jan. 21, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.wpr.org/bail-bondindustry-fights-back-against-moves-limit-or-end-cash-bail
[httsp://perma.cc/5BZR-Z9S5];
Jon
Schuppe, Civil Rights Groups Want To Put Bail Bond Industry on Death Row, NBC (Jan. 17, 2018, 6:42
PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/civil-rights-groups-want-put-bail-bond-industrydeath-row-n838531 [https://perma.cc/4FW6-BE9N].
27. Building in a comprehensive impact evaluation is one of the most straightforward ways to
embed learning into a project. In the Denver project mentioned previously, a five-year randomized
control trial was rolled out alongside the project, generating one of the longest and most rigorous
studies of supportive housing in the country. DENVER PERMANENT SUPPORTIVE HOUSING, supra
note 12, at 2; HOMELESS TO HOUSED, supra note 14, at 9–10. Even prior to the evaluation’s end,
interim results showing success now provide robust justification for continued service delivery.
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determine the efficacy of the reform and real-time data measurement to allow
the government to identify areas for improvement and respond immediately. 28
GOING FORWARD
Over the next year, the GPL will select a handful of jurisdictions to
collaborate with on developing and piloting solutions to key implementation
challenges related to bail and pretrial reform. We will report back in the future
on the lessons we learn as we attempt to carry the promise of bail reform
forward through implementation.

28. As a field-tested example of how state and local governments can shift their traditional use of
data toward practices that allow for timely identification of problems, continuous improvement, and
transformative systems change, see generally GOV’T PERFORMANCE LAB, HARVARD KENNEDY
SCH., ACTIVE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT: HOW GOVERNMENTS CAN COLLABORATE MORE
EFFECTIVELY WITH SOCIAL SERVICE PROVIDERS TO ACHIEVE BETTER RESULTS,
https://govlab.hks.harvard.edu/files/govlabs/files/active_contract_management_brief.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T43X-CXDK].
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